Acting Oneself as Another: An Actor\u27s Empathy for her Character by Gallagher, Shaun & Gallagher, Julia
University of Wollongong
Research Online
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - Papers Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts
2019
Acting Oneself as Another: An Actor's Empathy for
her Character
Shaun Gallagher
University of Wollongong, University of Memphis, shaung@uow.edu.au
Julia Gallagher
West Hollywood, Los Angeles, USA
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library:
research-pubs@uow.edu.au
Publication Details
Gallagher, S. & Gallagher, J. (2019). Acting Oneself as Another: An Actor's Empathy for her Character. Topoi: an International Review
of Philosophy, Online First 1-12.
Acting Oneself as Another: An Actor's Empathy for her Character
Abstract
What does it mean for an actor to empathize with the character she is playing? We review different theories of
empathy and of acting. We then consider the notion of "twofoldness" (Wollheim), which has been used to
characterize the observer or audience perspective on the relation between actor and character (Smith). This
same kind of twofoldness or double attunement applies from the perspective of the actor herself who must, at
certain points of preparation, distinguish between the character portrayed and her own portrayal effected in
her craft. We argue that this concept helps us to understand how the actor can empathize with her character.
For the actor who must study and rehearse her character, empathy may begin with higher-order (narrative or
imaginative) processes that provide a contextualized understanding of the character. This understanding
eventually integrates with more basic empathic processes in her actual performance.
Disciplines
Arts and Humanities | Law
Publication Details
Gallagher, S. & Gallagher, J. (2019). Acting Oneself as Another: An Actor's Empathy for her Character. Topoi:
an International Review of Philosophy, Online First 1-12.
This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/3790
Vol.:(0123456789) 
Topoi 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9624-7
Acting Oneself as Another: An Actor’s Empathy for her Character
Shaun Gallagher1,2  · Julia Gallagher3
 
© The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
What does it mean for an actor to empathize with the character she is playing? We review different theories of empathy and 
of acting. We then consider the notion of “twofoldness” (Wollheim), which has been used to characterize the observer or 
audience perspective on the relation between actor and character (Smith). This same kind of twofoldness or double attune-
ment applies from the perspective of the actor herself who must, at certain points of preparation, distinguish between the 
character portrayed and her own portrayal effected in her craft. We argue that this concept helps us to understand how the 
actor can empathize with her character. For the actor who must study and rehearse her character, empathy may begin with 
higher-order (narrative or imaginative) processes that provide a contextualized understanding of the character. This under-
standing eventually integrates with more basic empathic processes in her actual performance.
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“An actor’s job is empathy.” (Natalie Portman)1
“[T]o play truly means to be right, logical, coherent, to 
think, strive, feel, and act in unison with your role.... 
and thus assimilate a psychological technique of living 
a part” (Stanislavski 1936, p. 15, 16).
In this paper we address the following question: what 
does it mean for an actor to empathize with the character 
she is playing? The answer lies somewhere at the intersec-
tion between theories of empathy, of which there are many, 
and a variety of acting practices, of which there are many. 
This is a complex landscape. Our first task is to map this 
landscape (Sects. 1, 2, 3) and then to define our position on 
that map (Sect. 4).
1  Setting the Stage: Debates About 
Empathy
The psychologist Edward Titchener (1909) translated the 
German term Einfühlung by the new English term ‘empathy’ 
just around the time there was a lively debate in Germany 
about Einfühlung. Theodor Lipps (1906, 1909), a major fig-
ure in this debate, employed the term to refer to both our 
experience of aesthetic objects and our sense of other minds. 
Whereas Lipps thought of empathy as an everyday occur-
rence involving an automatic embodied resonance, Wilhelm 
Dilthey conceived of it as a methodological tool to be used 
for historical analysis and more generally as a method for the 
human and social sciences (see Stueber 2006, pp. 11–12). 
Dilthey (1992) contended that empathy involved a “transpos-
ing” [Hineinversetzen] process, where one puts oneself into 
the position of the other person. We want to immediately 
note the direct relevance of these considerations to acting: 
that there is an aesthetic object in the form of a character to 
portray; that empathy might count not only as something that 
happens, but as a method; and that it involves putting one-
self into the other’s perspective or situation. To make these 
relevant points clear, and to set the stage for our discussion, 
we think it is important to set out some of the details of the 
debate about empathy.
According to Moritz Geiger (1910), who provided a 
succinct summary of the early twentieth-century debate, 
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some theorists considered empathy to be a form of imagi-
nation, while others thought of it as a real instantiation of 
another person’s emotion. Lipps embraced the latter view. 
He claimed that we experience (not just imagine) the same 
thing the other person experiences. Thus, if we experience 
the anger of the other person, “this anger is not something 
that is simply objectively there facing us, but we are in it. 
We live in this anger, it fully gives itself, although for other 
reasons it does not have the same effectiveness as anger in 
daily life” (Geiger 1910, pp. 22; trans. revised).2 How we 
do this involves a form of projection in which we add some-
thing of ourselves to our experience of the other’s external 
signs (gestures, facial expressions, etc.): “we add something 
mental from our own inwardness—here we have a special 
act of the spontaneity of a mental nature, and not a simple 
intake of the data transmitted to us from the outside” (Geiger 
1910, p. 24, trans. revised; see; Lipps 1905, p. 17). Projec-
tion involves an elicitation of our own experience to fill in 
what we cannot access of the other’s experience.
Although Dilthey thought of empathy in similar terms of 
transposition and projection, he distinguished between “ele-
mentary understanding” and higher forms of understanding, 
both of which involve empathy. Elementary understanding 
arises in the context of practical life and our communicative 
practices. It involves the interpretation of basic expressive 
behaviors or activities (“such as picking up an object, letting 
a hammer drop, cutting wood with a saw”), which in turn 
add up to complex actions. To understand such actions one 
relies on one’s own experience and the “projection of the self 
into some given expression” (Dilthey 1976, p. 226).
The higher form of empathy is based on this elemen-
tary transposition (Dilthey 2002, p. 235), but with added 
concerns about context or the connectedness of experience, 
which “requires that the understanding go forward with the 
line of the events themselves. It must advance continually 
with the course of life itself. The process of transposing one-
self or transposition expands to make re-experiencing a crea-
tion along the line of the events” (Dilthey 2002, p. 235). This 
fuller or higher sense of empathy, he contends, is facilitated 
by artistic expression in poetry or theater, or by fictional or 
historical narrative. It involves a process of an imaginative 
re-presentation (Vergegenwärtigung) of a particular situa-
tion which “stimulates a re-experiencing in us” (ibid, 236). 
Specifically, by transposing oneself into the other’s circum-
stances one can re-live the other’s feelings. “Thus human 
beings who are determined from within can experience 
many other kinds of existence through their imagination. 
Confined by circumstances, they can nevertheless glimpse 
exotic beauties of the world and regions of life beyond their 
reach” (ibid, 327). This advanced form of empathy requires 
that we make judgments about the other person’s character 
and capacities. Context and circumstances matter in order 
to gain insight.
A number of phenomenologists (Edmund Husserl, Edith 
Stein, and Max Scheler, for example) joined the debate by 
offering a perceptual account of elementary empathy. In con-
trast to Lipps, for whom we come to experience the same 
emotion that the other experiences, according to Husserl, 
when we grasp that another person is angry, we do not nec-
essarily feel anger ourselves; if we see that someone else is 
fearful, we do not empathize by experiencing fear ourselves 
(Husserl 1973, p. 188). Zahavi (2014, p. 113) clarifies this 
objection: “How plausible is it to claim that I have to be 
scared myself in order to understand that my child is scared, 
or that I need to become furious myself if I am to recognize 
the fury in the face of my assailant.”
The phenomenologists see a second problem with Lipps’ 
position. It’s not clear that we project (or why we are war-
ranted to project) our own experience onto the other. At best, 
according to Stein (2012), this kind of projection would 
explain a form of automatic mimicry/contagion, which falls 
short of empathy. More positively, according to the phe-
nomenologists, empathy involves becoming perceptually 
aware of the other’s intentions and affective states. For both 
Husserl and Stein empathy is a unique form of perceptual 
intentionality directed at the other as an embodied subject. 
In empathic perception we perceive the other’s body not as 
an objective entity (Körper), as a scientist might perceive it, 
but as an experiencing or lived body (Leib), a body that is 
expressive of the other’s subjectivity. I get to this sense of 
the other’s body through the ambiguous experience of my 
own body as both lived and objective.3 Rather than a case 
of attributing, imagining, projecting, inferring, or cogniz-
ing the mental states of others, empathy involves a complex 
perceiving or apperception of the other’s intentions and 
feelings that are perceptually present in her gestures and 
expressions (Stein 2012, p. 3; Husserl 1952, p. 235). The 
phenomenological notion of pairing (Paarung) (Husserl 
1964), on which empathy is based, is a perceiving of the 
other’s embodied behavior in terms of a set of pragmatic and 
expressive capabilities that are also possibilities for my own 
embodied existence. Accordingly I see her bodily behaviors 
as intentions or feelings; in other words, I don’t perceive her 
in isolation but rather as directed at our shared world.
2 Similar claims can be found in eighteenth-century French authors 
such as Bernard Lamy (1699) and Jean-Baptiste Du Bos (1748). See 
Foster (2005).
3 Zahavi (2001, p. 161) explains that, according to Husserl, it “is 
exactly the unique subject–object status of [my own] body, the 
remarkable interplay between ipseity and alterity characterizing 
body-awareness that provides me with the means of recognizing other 
embodied subjects [as lived bodies]”.
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If we fast-forward 100 years we find a renewed debate on 
the concept of empathy underway at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century. This debate repeats many of the terms 
of the earlier one, including a distinction between elemen-
tary and higher-order empathy, and contrasting views simi-
lar to those defended by Lipps and the phenomenologists 
concerning elementary empathy, although now in the light 
of recent advances in the neurosciences. Indeed, the more 
recent debate has been motivated in part by the neurosci-
ence of mirror neurons (MNs), the activation of which has 
been interpreted as a form of simulation in philosophical 
and psychological accounts of social cognition. Simulation 
is a complex concept, but on one view simulation involves 
imaginatively placing ourselves in the shoes of the other 
person and asking what we would do in her situation. This 
kind of simulation is considered a form of empathy, where 
“the term ‘empathize’ [is] roughly equivalent to ‘simulate’ 
(in an inter-subjective fashion)” (Goldman 2006, p. 17, 205, 
291; 2011, p. 34).
Goldman (2006) and Stueber (2006), along with neuro-
scientists like Gallese (2001), argue that a very basic kind of 
automatic empathic simulation, which Gallese calls embod-
ied simulation, is linked to the activity of the MN system. 
In this respect, simulation theory draws on Lipp’s account 
of empathy as an automatic imitation or resonance which 
allows us to experience (not just imagine) the same thing 
that the other person experiences. MNs are activated when 
an agent engages in intentional action, and also when the 
agent observes another agent engaging in intentional action. 
Accordingly, MNs are said to simulate or match the other’s 
actions, intentions and/or feelings by activating the same 
mechanisms responsible for one’s own action and first-per-
son agentive-experience. On this view, the automatic simula-
tion or matching just is a basic form of empathy.
Again, as in the earlier debate, phenomenologists take 
issue with the claim that empathy reduces to an automatic 
activation of the motor system, something that seems closer 
to contagion than to empathy (Zahavi 2012). Or again, it is 
not necessary to match or replicate anger in my system, for 
example, in order to grasp the fact that the other person is 
angry (Zahavi 2014). I can never fully inhabit the other’s 
feeling from a first-person perspective. But I can attune 
to others’ intentions and emotions on the basis of what I 
perceive of their behaviors and bodily expressions (Moran 
2017), which, at least in part, constitute their intentions and 
emotions. To the extent that I understand their intentions 
and emotions in this way, that just is what phenomenologists 
call empathy.
2  Spotlighting Imagination and Narrative
In this and the following sections we set out a contrast 
between a simulation theory of empathy and an enactive 
theory of empathy, and we present arguments in favor of 
the latter. In the debates rehearsed above the focus was on 
the question: to what extent does empathy require (or not 
require) that one enters into the other’s perspective or situa-
tion in processes that involve automatic resonance or simu-
lation, imagination, projection, or simply perception? To 
get us closer to the question of the actor’s empathy for her 
character, however, we want to return to Dilthey’s distinction 
between elementary versus higher-order empathic under-
standing, and the idea that we may be able to use empathy 
as a method. Dilthey’s distinction is mirrored in the contem-
porary distinction between basic and higher-order simulation 
(Goldman 2006; Stueber 2006). Basic empathy, associated 
with MN activation, as Stueber suggests, is not sufficient to 
“explain and predict a person’s behavior in complex social 
situations” or to provide “a full grasp of all mental con-
cepts that we attribute to the typical adult” (2006, p. 147). 
We require something more for these abilities, namely, a 
higher-order empathy. According to a number of simula-
tion theorists, this more sophisticated form of understand-
ing requires the use of imagination and an understanding of 
the other’s contextualized situation (Goldman 2006; Stueber 
2006). On a simulationist view, for example, the empathic 
state involves an “as if” or vicarious affective state, gener-
ated by the empathizer’s imaginative portrayal of another 
person’s affective state. This capacity for creating vicarious 
experiences is based on a specific kind of imagination (call 
this S-imagination),4 which involves the running of off-line, 
high-level (i.e., explicit, conscious) simulations of the other 
person’s mental states (Vignemont and Jacob 2012, 2011).
There are several problems with the simulationist account 
(see Gallagher 2007, 2008, 2012). We’ll mention just two 
here: the starting problem and the diversity problem. The 
starting problem concerns how one can initiate this sort 
of S-imagination. This problem is apparent in Goldman’s 
description of the first step. “First, the attributor creates in 
herself pretend states intended to match those of the target 
[the other person]. In other words, the attributor attempts to 
put herself in the target’s ‘mental shoes’” (Goldman 2005, 
pp. 80–81). This first step already seems to assume that we 
understand the other person, i.e., that we know what mental 
states to imagine. Yet that is what simulation is meant to 
explain. How do I know what belief or desire matches the 
4 Goldman (2006) calls this type of imagination ‘enactive’ or 
E-imagination. To avoid some confusion with relevant enactivist 
approaches to empathy (discussed below) we’ll call this type of imag-
ination S-imagination (for simulative imagination).
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other person’s mental state? If I already know what state 
matches the target, then the problem of understanding or 
empathizing with others, as defined by simulation theory, 
would already be solved. The diversity problem is related 
to an objection raised by Ryle (1949) and a number of phe-
nomenologists, namely that if we limit ourselves to our own 
first-person experience, or to what we can imagine based on 
our own experiences, and project that onto the other person, 
it’s not clear that we are able to escape our own narrow per-
spective or genuinely grasp the other’s mental states, which 
may be quite different from our own. S-imagination is based 
on my first-person experience where I ask what I would do in 
that situation (Gazzola and Keysers 2008). It’s not clear that 
knowing what I would do gives me insight into what anyone 
else might do. There is a large diversity of experiences that 
others can have; but S-imagination seems designed simply 
to project our own experience onto the other.
A contrasting, non-simulationist theory of higher-order 
empathy, and one that we prefer, argues that I can start to 
imagine the other person’s situation (rather than her mental 
state), and thereby start to empathize with her, by drawing 
on a rich store of narratives derived from both personal and 
cultural sources (Gallagher 2012; Gallagher and Hutto 2008; 
Hutto 2007). On this narrative-practice view, our reliance on 
narrative reduces the need for simulationist style imagina-
tion. Since empathy is other-directed in a strong sense, it is 
not sufficient for empathy to simply view the other through 
the lens of my own experience. Rather, through narrative 
practices I gain an openness to understanding another’s life 
story, and to understanding his experience in his context. 
This kind of N[arrative]-imagination, by drawing from a 
diversity of narratives that have informed my understand-
ing and enriched my imagination, does not depend on sim-
ulation, conceived of as relying only on my own narrow 
experience. In contrast to Stueber (2008), who suggests that 
narrative simply provides “hints and clues” to enhance the 
simulation (empathetic reenactment) process, the narrative 
view is that we rely heavily on narrative resources, which 
open up the process to the more diverse circumstances that 
may characterize the other. Narrative resources can include 
our own self-narratives, but importantly includes the diverse 
narratives of others and more general cultural narratives 
(novels, plays, films, etc.) with which we are familiarized 
starting at a very young age.
N-imagination also starts at a very young age. We appeal 
here not only to accounts of the development of narra-
tive competency in early childhood, but also to accounts 
of imagination as an enactive practice (Rucinska 2014).5 
For example, Ryle’s account of imagination suggests that 
imagination starts in childhood, not as a set of psychical 
processes in the head, but as a form of pretending or play-
acting. Ryle’s example is the child pretending to be a bear. 
In this case the child “roars, he pads around the floor, he 
gnashes his teeth, and he pretends to sleep in what he pre-
tends is a cave” (1949, p. 243). That is, the child does not 
first draw up some image in his head, and then proceed to 
playact it out; rather, as Ryle suggests, the imagining is in 
the performance of playacting. This kind of playacting is a 
case of (en)acting oneself as another, and it follows a nar-
rative structure.6
This non-simulationist account of narrative practices is 
part of an enactive theory of higher-order empathy. Empa-
thy of this sort depends on the exercise of N-imagination, 
which in some cases can be embodied in one’s actions, as 
in the case of the child’s pretend play. The enactive account 
of empathy also includes an alternative interpretation of the 
role of MN activation in basic empathy. The enactive theory 
follows the phenomenological idea that basic empathy is 
perceptual, and specifically that it involves an action-ori-
ented or enactive perception. I perceive the world in terms 
of how I can engage with it; and I perceive others in terms 
of how I can interact with them, even if I am not intending 
to interact with them. Within this perceptual process MNs 
are activated not for a simulative matching of the other’s 
just past action that I have just perceived, but as an enac-
tive preparation for responding to the other. Basic empathy 
involves this other-oriented response. Responding to the 
other includes the possibility of imitating them, but, as we’ll 
see below, it also includes the possibility of acting oneself 
as another, which is not reducible to imitation.
Dilthey’s suggestion that we can use empathy as a method 
for gaining an understanding of others seems to apply to 
higher-order empathy rather than to processes of basic 
empathy. We note, however, that these two forms of empa-
thy may be causally and reciprocally related. It is intuitive to 
think, as Dilthey did, that higher-order empathy may depend 
in some way on basic empathy, so that a purely intellec-
tual understanding of a person’s context may not elicit a 
higher-order empathy unless some form of basic empathy 
is activated. It is also the case, however, that understanding 
the other’s context or story can modulate or even generate 
more basic resonance processes, as sometimes happens in 
5 “Children’s first narrative productions occur in action, in episodes 
of symbolic play by groups of peers, accompanied by—rather than 
solely though—language. Play is an important developmental source 
of narrative” (Nelson 2003, p. 28). As Richner and Nicolopoulou 
(2001, p. 408) put it, there are “two aspects of children’s narrative 
6 One finds a similar idea in body-psychotherapy where patients are 
asked to act out their stories. For more on the relation between imagi-
nation, narrative, and pretend play, see Gallagher 2017; Gallagher and 
Hutto 2019.
activity which are too often treated in mutual isolation: the discursive 
exposition of narratives in storytelling and their enactments in pre-
tend play.”
Footnote 5 (continued)
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reading a novel or viewing a film. Empirical studies show, 
for example, differential mirror-system responses to the (fic-
tional) punishment of someone who the subject knows has 
either cheated or played fairly at a game show—specifically, 
no or less response to the punishment of the cheater (Singer 
et al. 2006). Other studies show that we are more inclined 
to act on our empathic feelings, and act altruistically, when 
we know the other person’s personal narrative in contrast 
to knowing impersonal information about a general situa-
tion (Slovic 2007). Specific types of social knowledge, or 
knowing the context or the other’s story, then, may have an 
effect on basic empathic processes, making them less than 
automatic. Such reciprocal causal relations suggest that basic 
empathy and higher-order empathy are integrated processes 
and are thus not always clearly distinguishable. We can rep-
resent this relation in the following (Fig. 1).
The distinction between higher-order, N-imagination-
based empathy and basic empathy is similar to what Kurt 
Goldstein called categorical or abstract versus concrete 
attitudes. In this respect, we should think of the relation 
between basic empathic processes and higher-order empa-
thy more in terms of a gestalt relation as Goldstein suggests.
[The concrete attitude] is embedded in and codeter-
mined by the abstract attitude. For instance, in the nor-
mal person both attitudes are always present in a defi-
nite figure-ground relation. (Goldstein and Scheerer 
1964, p. 8)
3  Acting and Acting Method
It is the crudest form of empathy when the actor sim-
ply asks: what should I be like if this or that were to 
happen to me? (Brecht 1975a, p. 195).
Our question is whether an actor can or does empathize 
with the character that she plays. If so, precisely what form 
does this empathy take? One possibility is that over the 
course of studying a role, an actor moves through different 
stages that involve both (or some integrated process of) basic 
empathy and higher-order empathy. Indeed, one might think 
that this is the ordinary course of events more generally in 
contexts that involve empathizing with others. That is, we 
may start in an initial encounter with either a basic form 
of empathy transitioning into a higher-order form as one 
comes to know the other’s (or the character’s) story and cir-
cumstances, or vice versa. One challenge for this view with 
respect to acting is that, in most circumstances, the character 
to be (en)acted (especially if the character is fictional) is 
not physically present. One might start with a script that 
describes the character, or, in the case of a character who 
is a historical figure, reading material or a documentary 
film. These are different situations, but in either case there 
is no other person present in-person or face-to-face. Do such 
situations elicit anything like an immediate form of basic 
empathy?
In the case of starting with a script, we are not perceiv-
ing another person, or seeing someone engaged in inten-
tional actions. This eliminates the phenomenological idea 
of a direct perception of the other’s experience in their ges-
tures, facial expressions, etc. But there is some evidence 
that reading about actions activates our motor system, and 
that, in so doing, reading generates a type of simulation or 
resonance (Hauk et al. 2004; Tettamanti et al. 2005). The 
silent reading of action words (e.g., lick, pick, kick) leads to 
activation of different areas of the premotor or motor areas 
involved in the control of mouth, hand, or foot, respectively. 
This may suggest a very basic motor resonance of the sort 
that Lipps describes in terms of proprioceptive-kinaesthetic 
activations/experiences. Even if the mirror neuron system is 
activated by reading specific words (as Gallese [2008] tenta-
tively suggests), however, this seems a poor cousin to basic 
empathy for the person we read about, even if the text or 
script is action packed. Albeit specific for action components 
(kicking vs. licking), it seems more like a typical arousal 
response that happens for a variety of objects. The sight of 
a hammer, for example, will activate canonical neurons in 
the premotor cortex suggesting that we see things in terms 
of the action possibilities they afford. If something similar 
happens when we read a sentence such as ‘He picks up the 
hammer’, it is not clear that this is empathy for the character, 
rather than the arousal of an instrumental attitude in relation 
to the hammer.
We know, however, that reading a text or watching a film 
can elicit more specific intersubjective responses—vari-
ous emotions, empathy, and sympathy. “Film experience is 
embodied: the brain and the body—even viscera and the 
skin—constantly resonate in accordance with the film’s 
flow, with changes in muscular tension, perspiration, stom-
ach state, etc.” (Grodal and Kramer 2010; see; Raz et al. 
2012). This may be “guided by the narrative and aesthetic 
orchestration of a film” (Grodal and Kramer 2010, p. 28). 
That MN activations, or processes involved in direct inter-
subjective perception, are possible when watching films has 
been suggested by Gallese and his research group in Berlin. 
Fig. 1  An enactive model of empathy
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On this view, we can empathize with a character in a film 
by simulating her actions and emotions. This is evidenced 
by physiological changes such as galvanic skin response 
(GSR), which indicates emotional arousal (see Kaltwasser 
2018). Murray Smith (2017) picks up on this account and 
on Gallese’s notion of embodied simulation, as a way to 
explain a viewer’s empathy with a character. “Mimicry of 
basic actions and emotions may scaffold the imagination, 
including the empathic imagination, of more elaborate, 
finely specified states of mind” (Smith 2017, p. 180). These 
studies suggest that an actor, in reading a script or in viewing 
a documentary film about the character, could get an initial 
empathic feel for her character. This seemingly approaches 
the immediate aspects of basic empathy, although this 
empathic response may not be exactly the same, or as strong 
as when one encounters someone in person.
The authors just cited interpret such resonance or MN 
activation in terms of simulation, but, as suggested above, 
we can also interpret these processes from an enactivist per-
spective. Two things should be kept in mind. First, basic 
empathy seems more complicated than simply the match-
ing or mimicking of what one sees. In reading a novel or 
watching a film the context provided by the novel or film 
matters. In this respect, reading and perceptual processes are 
already primed by and integrated with complex imaginative 
processes which can easily include an action-oriented stance 
concerning what I would do or be prepared to do in response 
to the character I was viewing or about whom I was reading.7 
This is the enactive interpretation of such processes, which 
acknowledges some action-oriented complexity. Second, the 
discussion focuses on a reader or viewer as part of the audi-
ence. Whether the simulationist description applies to the 
audience member or not (and this could include an actor 
who is in the process of studying in order to understand the 
character), it doesn’t apply to the actor who is engaged in 
a performance. In the latter case, as Cook (2007, p. 591) 
points out, an actor does not imitate a character: “actors 
perform actions required of their characters—they do not 
‘imitate’ this action, they perform it.”
If the processes just described involve basic empathy, 
they also already seem to involve higher-order empathy and 
the use of imagination and narrative. As indicated by Grodal 
and Kramer (2010, p. 28), these processes are already guided 
by the narrative of the film or novel. From the perspective 
of professional practice, pursuing these narratives is part 
of the preparatory work that the actor must do. Especially 
at the beginning of the process, in many cases one needs to 
engage in imaginative practices in order to non-judgmen-
tally attune to the character. Here we distinguish between 
an empathic understanding of the character, and an evalua-
tive judgment about the character. An evaluative judgment 
can rob an actor of empathy, creating too much distance 
or separation between the actor and the character. Indeed, 
there may be some evaluative components involved in the 
perceptual processes of basic empathy,8 and one may require 
some methodological exercises to overcome such effects. 
Instead of making an evaluative judgment about the char-
acter, actors will sometimes use higher-order empathy as a 
method, explicitly setting aside any evaluative judgments, 
potentially to seek out and accept that this character is the 
way she is because of specific circumstances. Here one pos-
sible aim would be to empathize with the character through 
an understanding of those circumstances. In some cases this 
may involve creating the character as one goes through a 
systematic absorption of the material, explicitly aiming for 
an empathic understanding in a process of integrating each 
word/action of the character into one’s own performance 
(Goldstein and Winner 2010). This would be one way to 
use a higher-order empathy as a method in order to achieve 
something like a basic empathy for the character.
This use of a higher-order form of empathy, then, may 
involve an actor’s research about her character with the aim 
of understanding the detailed contexts or circumstances of 
a character’s life or story. In this way the actor may use her 
N-imagination to enact a sense of the physical, mental, emo-
tional feel of what a character would go through in a certain 
situation. An actor doesn’t need to get physically beaten to 
know what it physically, mentally, and emotionally feels like 
to be in a physically abusive relationship, for example. This 
type of process, however, is not reducible to the immediate 
resonance of basic empathy—it requires a more mediated 
use of N-imagination, drawing not only on one’s personal 
experience, but also on more general narrative resources. 
This correlates to an actor’s work of getting to know her 
character.
As we noted, at the beginning of an acting process the 
actor may be in a similar observational position as someone 
in an audience (reading a narrative or seeing a film about 
the character). The “work” of the actor in this case is to 
8 Studies that show that activation of early visual areas are not evalu-
ative (or reward) neutral (Shuler and Bear 2006), or neutral with 
respect to perceiving a character as belonging to an in-group versus 
out-group (e.g., Xu et al. 2009).
7 There is much more to be said about this than we can discuss here. 
The idea that perception (and reading) and imagination are closely 
intertwined is a theme that can be found in the phenomenologists 
(e.g., Husserl 1980; Sartre 2004), in much of the cognitive science 
literature just cited, which suggests that imagination activates early 
sensory areas in the brain (see Kosslyn and Thompson 2003) and in 
recent predictive processing models that contend that perception and 
cognitive processes like reading are informed by priors (e.g., Price 
and Devlin 2011). These different literatures, however, make dramati-
cally different assumptions and it would take more room than we have 
here to adjudicate among them (see Gallagher and Allen 2018).
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transition from an observer-audience stance to a position 
of enacting the character, which is not just representing a 
character as a painting might represent an idea, but a form of 
living or performing her character. In some cases, this work 
may be harder than in other cases. Consider, for example, a 
view (albeit a simulationist view) of what happens when, as 
part of the audience, one views a character in a film:
Engagement is fed by the viewer’s own previous 
experiences of pain and loss, which can influence the 
‘like me’ framework—depending on the relationship 
between viewer and character. Sometimes a character 
will not invite the vicarious sharing of emotions. The 
character’s actions or the situation they are in could be 
too farfetched for the viewer to allow empathy; in the 
latter case conscious simulation by the viewer might be 
required in order to understand the character. (Grodal 
and Kramer 2010, p. 27, citing; Smith 1995).
From the perspective of the actor, however, if a charac-
ter does not invite the vicarious sharing of emotions, that 
makes the work of empathy more difficult, but even more 
important. In some circumstances it may be right to think 
that the actor fails if they cannot empathically get inside the 
character’s “farfetched” actions (but we’ll see below that this 
is not universally accepted in acting theory).
One might also think that by means of this higher-order 
empathic process of getting inside the character’s “head” or 
getting familiar with his actions in various situations, one’s 
more immediate feel for the character might be strengthened. 
In this way, higher-order empathy does not remain purely 
an intellectual understanding; it may be closer to an emo-
tional understanding, as it is described by actors. One way 
to understand this is that the higher-order work of empathy 
(using narrative-imaginative practices) leads to a perfor-
mance that elicits, in the actor, something closer to basic 
empathy-in-performance, allowing the character to come 
alive in the actor’s work.
Whether this feeling approaches an actor’s identity with 
the character, or a strong form of attunement, is an issue that 
may qualify what can be described as empathy. On the one 
hand, most theorists of empathy maintain that empathy is 
not equivalent to an identity with the other person; empathy 
requires that the distinction between self and other is main-
tained (Decety 2005). Paul Ricoeur (1992, p. 193) calls this 
a ‘nonsubstitutibility’ anchored in the use of the first-person 
pronoun. On the other hand, one might think that when the 
actor is finished with her research and is actually perform-
ing her role, she is bringing the character to life, and her 
motor system is enacting the character in a way that goes 
beyond empathy.9 She is no longer empathically observing 
or simulating the actions of another; she is enacting them, 
and the actor/character is saying ‘I’, so that the distinction 
between self and other diminishes.
These are issues that are often discussed in acting theory. 
Here we briefly discuss three different theories to see how 
they approach questions about empathy. These are three out 
of many methods of acting, although these are classic and 
well-known theories—pillars on which others have built.
(1) One view, which derives from Denis Diderot (1883), is 
that the actor must remain “cold” and avoid empathy 
for her character. This was also the position of Ber-
tolt Brecht. Brecht takes empathy to mean matching 
emotional states, as one finds in simulation theory. 
The actor must try to avoid empathically matching a 
character’s emotional state by practicing an “alienation 
effect,” which “intervenes, not in the form of absence 
of emotion, but in the form of emotions which need not 
correspond to those of the character portrayed” (Brecht 
1975a, p. 94). The actor should avoid being infected 
with the emotions portrayed; if emotions are to be por-
trayed, it is not by means of empathy (Brecht 1975b, p. 
145).
  John Metcalf describes a method that would guide 
the actor to this end. The actor must maintain a double 
consciousness—“one part of it being devoted to the 
character portrayed, the other part maintaining a watch-
ful and critical attitude on the part of the actor’s own 
real self” (Metcalf 1931, p. 236). Imagination, accord-
ing to Metcalf, makes this possible by allowing the 
actor to remain somewhat distant from a real emotion, 
which may be a form of protection for the actor. “If the 
actor cannot vividly represent to himself in imagination 
the mental attitude of the character he is to portray, it is 
hopeless for him to try to represent it to other people. 
Imagining a given mental state tends to stimulate the 
motor responses appropriate to that state, and these, 
once produced, are controlled, modified, selected, and 
9 Let’s note that this is complicated further by the fact that in per-
formance an actor is typically working with others—other actors and 
the director, for example—and even if the actor is alone on theatrical 
stage or in soliloquy, there is also an audience that responds to the 
character. All of these others may generate their own intersubjective 
responses that can modulate an actor’s performance and her empathy 
for her character. As Grodal and Kramer (2010, p. 27), note: “The 
director’s lack of craftsmanship might also fail to encourage empa-
thetic resonance, despite their intentions.” An audience’s empathic 
or non-empathic response may interfere much less with the actor’s 
empathic resonance with her character if the actor is fully engaged 
with her performance. We don’t try to answer this question here—
whether it is possible or not to ignore audience reaction. One might 
argue that if an actor is swayed in empathic resonance by an audi-
ence’s reaction, then some form of evaluative judgment may be inter-
fering with her performance, and with her empathy for the character 
in general.
Footnote 9 (continued)
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developed through rehearsal in the interest of the art of 
the theatre” (p. 236). Metcalf follows Titchener in dis-
tinguishing the imagined/virtual kinaesthetic response 
from a real one, where the kinaesthetic image is limited 
in terms of what motor processes are activated. “Real 
emotions are out of place on the stage” (p. 237).
(2) In contrast, Konstantin Stanislavski advises the actor to 
draw on her own experience. He thus builds a simula-
tionist view that encourages empathy.
 Once you have established this contact between 
your life and your part, you will find that inner 
push or stimulus. Add a whole series of contin-
gencies based on your own experience in life, and 
you will see how easy it will be for you sincerely 
to believe in the possibility of what you are called 
upon to do on the stage... The feelings aroused 
will express themselves in the acts of this imagi-
nary person had he been placed in the circum-
stances made by the play. (Stanislavski 1936, p. 
41, 49)
  The actor’s job, according to Stanislavski is to create 
the inner life of the character and to express it in artistic 
form. This is an embodied craft, allowing for controlled 
responses of vocal and physical apparatus (Stanislavski 
1936, pp. 15–17).10 According to Jean Benedetti (1998, 
p. 2), Stanislavski requires the actor to draw on per-
sonal experience in portraying a character.
 Since there is no ‘character’ out there somewhere, 
only me on the stage in an imaginary situation, my 
initial exploration of the play must be as myself, 
as me. To turn fiction into fact for me, I have to ask 
myself at every point in the play, ‘If this situation 
were true, what would I do?’ (Benedetti 1998, p. 
8).
  The actor needs to draw on her own affective mem-
ory so that the fictional character can express real emo-
tion—precisely the thing that Metcalf suggests has no 
place on the stage. This is accomplished through a form 
of empathy that seemingly involves both a simulation 
based on the actor’s own experience, and a higher-order 
use of narrative as the actor (and his company) explores 
the play to gain “a sense of the play as a whole, and its 
meaning”—its complete narrative context (Benedetti 
1998, p. 6).
  This approach is also consistent with an idea preva-
lent in Dilthey’s romantic hermeneutics, namely that 
we are able to empathically understand the other, even 
someone historically or culturally removed from us, 
because there is something like a universal human 
nature that we can tap into. Dilthey follows Schleier-
macher in appealing to empathy as a shared form of 
access that is universally human. This was the basis 
for Schleiermacher’s “divinatory” method of interpreta-
tion. “The divinatory is based on the assumption that 
each person is not only a unique individual in his own 
right, but that he has a receptivity to the uniqueness of 
every other person” (Schleiermacher 1977, sect. 2.6). 
On this view, unique or not, we are all capable of the 
same or similar things. Empathy allows the actor to see 
a character as if it were she (the actor) faced with the 
different circumstances that characterize the character’s 
life. An actor can accept the circumstances as her own 
because they can and always will be a possibility for 
her.
(3) Sanford Meisner’s approach can be conceived as a 
move away from the simulationist view toward a more 
enactivist or action-oriented method. Meisner rec-
ommends that the actor “gets out of [her] head,” i.e., 
shifts away from her own affective memory, or internal 
thoughts about, or higher-order imaginative simulations 
of the character, which have a “tendency to make actors 
more introverted…. Introverted actors tend to retreat 
into their thoughts, where they can’t react fully to what 
goes on around them.” (Esper and DiMarco 2008, p. 
215). The actor, to perform the character’s actions, to 
become the character, should engage instinctively and 
emotionally with the present environment and the other 
actors.
  Getting out of one’s head is an enactivist conception 
that takes as a starting point the fact that we are dynam-
ically in a world of affordances. In this regard, Lutterbie 
(2011, p. 102) cites Evan Thompson’s enactivist view 
of empathy: “This dialogical dynamic is not a linear or 
additive combination of two preexisting, skull-bound 
minds. It emerges from and reciprocally shapes the 
nonlinear coupling of oneself to another in percep-
tion and action, emotion and imagination, gesture and 
speech.” Although Lutterbie mentions imagination, the 
emphasis here is on basic empathy. Acting, especially 
acting face-to-face with other characters, draws on 
one’s natural interactional processes and on the affor-
dances provided by one’s surroundings. A performance 
that follows such principles just is an empathic per-
formance since, as Thompson suggests, such concrete 
encounters “of self and other fundamentally involve 
empathy, understood as a unique and irreducible kind 
of intentionality” (Thompson 2001, p. 1). In this regard, 
the enactivist account follows the phenomenological 
conception of empathy as a “non-inferential bodily [and 
10 See Connolly and Ralley (2007) for an analysis of Stanislavski 
from the perspective of embodied cognition, action-orientation, and 
MNs. Also, Hatfield et  al. (2011) for the importance of action/pos-
ture, etc. in Stanislavski’s method. Cook (2007, p. 592) provides 
interesting examples of how acting can affect both body image and 
body schema.
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perceptually-based] pairing of self and other” (2001, 
p, 9) which takes place, not in one’s head, but in the 
performance, and in dyadic interactions with others.11 
Just as we become who we are in our everyday situ-
ated interactions with others, in the acting performance 
one becomes the character who is elicited by the other 
characters and by the staged situation. According to this 
interpretation of Meisner’s technique, empathy is not a 
tool to be used by the actor; it is something enacted in 
the acting performance, not unlike Ryle’s child who in 
pretend playacts the bear.
 We note that these different approaches to acting are pre-
scriptive ones. They specify how, ideally, the actor ought to 
act and how empathy fits that prescription. Our own interest, 
in contrast, is descriptive. We are asking how empathy works 
in the various possibilities that acting allows. In this respect 
there may not be one clear-cut answer since those possibili-
ties may vary depending on which technique or method the 
actor uses.
4  A Twofold Conception
To give us a sense of how empathy works in the various pos-
sibilities that acting allows, we propose to adapt the notion 
of “twofoldness” that Wollheim (1987) uses to character-
ize a double aspect of depiction in art. For Wollheim, our 
experience of a work of art is twofold in that it has a double 
intentionality:12 it is a co-consciousness (or what phenome-
nologists sometimes call an ‘apperception’) of what is repre-
sented and of the work of art as a thing involving or express-
ing a technique of representation. Wollheim thus emphasizes 
a kind of double intentionality in which we know that we 
are not face-to-face with the painted (represented) figure, 
yet we encounter or see-in the painting the character por-
trayed. Importantly, he emphasizes, these are “two aspects 
of a single experience that I have … two aspects [that are] 
distinguishable but also inseparable… [T]hey are not two 
experiences” (1987, p. 46).
Smith (2011, 279 ff) uses Wollheim’s notion of twofold-
ness to characterize the relation between the audience and 
the character/actor. In both of these analyses the phenom-
enon of twofoldness, the ability to “see-in” the physical 
aspects of the artwork, or the craft of the actor, the object 
depicted or the character portrayed, concerns the observer 
or audience perspective on the work of art or the character. 
To see how this may be applied in the context of acting, 
consider Jean-Paul Sartre’s example of the French actress 
Claire Franconay impersonating Maurice Chevalier (Sartre 
2004, 25 ff). As a member of the audience watching Fran-
conay, according to Sartre, one is always aware that one is 
witnessing an impersonation; when one imagines Chevalier 
with the help of Franconay, one is always aware that Cheva-
lier is not literally present, but imagined. There is a kind of 
double consciousness that on the one hand allows you to see 
Chevalier, and on the other hand allows you to critically ask 
whether Franconay is getting it “right.” In his analysis of this 
consciousness Sartre indicates two important features: that 
there is a knowledge (a prior knowledge of Chevalier and the 
characteristic things that he would do on stage, as well as 
the knowledge that Chevalier is not present), and an affective 
aspect—(“All perception [i.e., of Franconay] is accompanied 
by an affective reaction” [2004, p. 28])—a feeling of the 
presence of Chevalier.
The notion of twofoldness has also been explained within 
the framework of simulation theory. Part of the simulation-
ist story as it applies to the observer/audience perspective 
is that basic mirror system processes activated when we see 
the character portrayed may also be activated in response to 
noticing the actor’s portrayal, including details of her tech-
nique. This is an argument made by Joerg Fingerhut (2018), 
drawing from both Smith (2011, 2017) and the theory of 
Freedberg and Gallese (2007). Again, this is a theory drawn 
from an analysis of what happens in viewing an artwork 
(e.g., a painting or sculpture) and applied to what happens 
when we are part of the theatrical audience. With respect to 
the artwork, Freedberg and Gallese argue that various physi-
cal properties of artwork allow the observer to grasp the 
artist’s style by activating the mirror neuron system (MNS), 
which responds to the physical aspects in the artifact even if 
no human figure is represented (Umiltà et al. 2012). Finger-
hut summarizes more recent research.
In a recent series of studies, Heimann, Gallese, and 
colleagues have applied MNS paradigms also to the 
study of filmic means. They used different edits (con-
tinuity vs. noncontinuity editing) or different camera 
and lens movements (zoom vs. dolly cam vs. steady 
cam) to film the same scene. As they discovered, those 
different configurational aspects of the presentation of 
a scene engage the motor system [of an audience mem-
ber] differentially (see Heimann et al. 2017, for cuts, 
11 In this regard there may be significant differences in empathic 
performance between acting on stage with other actors and acting on 
camera where it is often the case that an actor is not in face-to-face 
contact with her interlocutor. In this case the director, but especially 
the script and the actor’s N-imagination may be even more crucial 
for empathic performance. In stage production practices of blocking 
(which include the design of the performance space, the placing and 
movement of objects or props, and especially the positioning of actors 
for a particular scene helps to scaffold the actor’s performance; in 
film, however, according to the film actor Richard Gere (in conversa-
tion), good writing (i.e., a good screenplay) can do something similar.
12 We take the term ‘double intentionality’ from Scruton (2009) who 
makes a similar point in the context of music.
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and, 2014, for camera). In each of their self-produced 
scenes there is an actress/actor present, grasping or 
passing an object. (Fingerhut 2018, p. 32).
On this simulationist view the MNS is seemingly affected 
in a double way, attuned to both the character (or the action) 
being portrayed and the editorial and filmic techniques that 
shape the scene’s meaning. Details that pertain to con-
text and are shaped by the camera and filmic techniques 
are shown to affect subpersonal processes that inform our 
perception. Such filmic techniques may be something we 
become conscious of from a critical perspective, in the same 
way that, as Sartre suggests, we may become conscious of 
how well Franconay is doing Chevalier. Picking up on this 
Sartrean point, since an actor is present and engaged in some 
action in the experimental film, the viewer may be attuned 
to the actor’s technique as well as to the action portrayed. 
This kind of diplopia may involve shifting from one focus 
to another, sometimes being absorbed in the character and 
story line, and sometimes noticing the filmic or acting tech-
niques. But as Wollheim suggests, this may also be one dou-
ble experience.
We suggest that this same kind of twofoldness or double 
attunement also applies, with some modification,13 from 
the perspective of the actor who must, at certain points of 
preparation, distinguish between the character portrayed and 
her own portrayal effected in her craft. This double attune-
ment is not the same thing as empathy but both basic and 
higher-order empathy can help fine-tune this twofoldness 
in the actor. Indeed, in her performance the basic empathic 
experience that emerges is correlated to an integrated set 
of subpersonal (motoric, kinaesthetic, affective) processes 
since in the performance the character’s actions are in fact 
generated by the actor’s own movements of which she is pre-
reflectively aware. At the same time the actor’s higher-order 
empathic understanding of the character needs to be folded 
into this embodied-affective performance. Her higher-order 
empathic understanding of the character operates as a guide 
to her awareness of her own technique and about whether 
she is getting the character “right.” The double attunement 
happens when this higher-order empathic attitude is embed-
ded in and is codetermined by the basic empathic attitude, 
so that both attitudes are present in a figure-ground relation.
This double attunement, which in some instances may 
involve a shifting from background to foreground, from one 
perspective to another is, for the actor, a shift from an in-
performance awareness of the world and others through the 
eyes of the character, to a self-awareness of performance.14 
This is a kind of expert ability that involves maintaining and 
at the same time manipulating what we characterized (in 
Sect. 2) as integrated processes of basic and higher-order 
empathy that are not always clearly distinguishable off stage, 
in everyday life. This kind of dynamical shifting from back-
ground to foreground and vice versa may be more sustained 
or frequent as the actor prepares her role. It becomes less 
frequent, and closer to a fully integrated experience during 
performance. Accomplishing this double attunement takes 
rehearsal and work which are transformed into performance. 
These processes constitute the actor’s expertise. From the 
perspective of the actor, self (i.e., the actor) and other (the 
character) are still distinguishable, but also inseparable in 
the performance. It is the twofoldness of the experience 
that prevents us from conceiving of the actor-character rela-
tion as one of identity, which would destroy the empathic 
relation.
In everyday life, instances of empathy that may be initi-
ated in our basic responses to others involving embodied 
(motor, kinaesthetic, perceptual and affective) processes 
can progress into higher-order concerns about understand-
ing context (via N-imagination). In contrast, for the actor 
who must study and prepare and rehearse her character, the 
process may begin with higher-order processes that provide 
a contextualized empathic understanding of the character 
that eventually and to varying degrees, integrates with the 
more basic empathic processes in her actual performance.
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to the actor rather than the audience. As one reviewer suggested, the 
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the empathic relation, being both the empathizer and performing the 
character with whom she is empathizing. That this kind of ambiguous 
“reversible” relation is not only possible but familiar in everyday life 
is made clear by phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty (2012) in his 
description of our relation to our own body which is both the body 
that experiences (lived body or Leib) and the body that we can expe-
rience as an object (Körper). This ambiguity, which allows for shift-
ing our perspective on ourselves, is also related to the phenomenolog-
ical explanation of empathy which, as noted above, involves the (ap)
perception (or co-perception) of the other person’s lived body grasped 
through the experience of our own lived body.
14 This may involve an enhanced form of pre-reflective self-aware-
ness similar to that described by dancers, musicians and athletes (see 
Christensen et al. 2016; Gallagher 2018; Montero 2010; Salice et al. 
2017).
Acting Oneself as Another: An Actor’s Empathy for her Character 
1 3
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Crea-
tive Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creat iveco 
mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribu-
tion, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the 
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Benedetti J (1998) Stanislavski and the actor. Methuen Drama, 
London
Brecht B (1975a) A short organum for the theatre. In: Willett J (ed 
& trans.), Brecht on theatre: the development of an aesthetic. 
Methuen., London p 181, § 4
Brecht B (1975b) Alienation effects in chinese acting. In: Willett 
J (ed & trans.), Brecht on theatre: the development of an aes-
thetic. Methuen, London
Christensen W, Sutton J, McIlwain DJ (2016) Cognition in skilled 
action: meshed control and the varieties of skill experience. 
Mind Lang 31(1):37–66
Connolly R, Ralley R (2007) The laws of normal organic life or 
Stanislavski explained: towards a scientific account of the 
subconscious in Stanislavski’s system. Stud Theatre Perform 
27(3):237–259
Cook A (2007) Interplay: the method and potential of a cognitive 
scientific approach to theatre. Theatre J 59(4):579–594
de Vignemont F (2012) What is it like to feel another’s pain? Philos 
Sci 79(2):295–316
Decety J (2005) Une anatomie de l’empathie. Psychiatr Sci Humain 
3(11):16–24
Diderot D (1883) The paradox of acting [Le paradoxe sur le comedien] 
Trans W. H. Pollock. Chatto and Windus, London
Dilthey W (1976) Dilthey: selected writings. Trans. Rickman HP. 
Cambridge University Press, London
Dilthey W (1992) Gesammelte Schriften. vol 7, Der Aufbau der 
geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften. B. G. Teu-
bner Verlagsgesellschaft, Stuttgart
Dilthey W (2002) The formation of the historical world in the human 
sciences. In: Makkreel R, Rodi F (eds) Selected works, vol 3. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp 101–174
Du Bos J-B (1748) Critical reflections on poetry, painting, and music, 
vol 3. Trans. Nugent T, reprinted 1978. AMS Press, New York
Esper W, Dimarco D (2008) The actor’s art and craft: William Esper 
teaches the meisner technique. Anchor Books, New York
Fingerhut J (2018) Embodied seeing-in, empathy, and expan-
sionism. Projections 12(2):28–38. https ://doi.org/10.3167/
proj.2018.12020 5
Foster SL (2005) Choreographing empathy. Topoi 24(1):81–91
Freedberg D, Gallese V (2007) Motion, emotion and empathy in 
esthetic experience. Trends Cognit Sci 11(5):197–203
Gallagher S (2007) Simulation trouble. Soc Neurosci 2(3–4):353–365
Gallagher S (2008) Neural simulation and social cognition. In: Pineda 
JA (ed) Mirror neuron systems: the role of mirroring processes in 
social cognition. Humana Press, Totowa, p 355–371
Gallagher S (2012) Empathy, simulation and narrative. Sci Context 
25(3):301–327
Gallagher S (2017) Enactivist interventions: rethinking the mind. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford
Gallagher S (2018) Mindfulness and mindlessness in performance. 
Italian J Cognit Sci 5(1):5–18
Gallagher S, Allen M (2018) Active inference, enactivism and the 
hermeneutics of social cognition. Synthese 195(6):2627–2648
Gallagher S, Hutto D (2008) Understanding others through primary 
interaction and narrative practice. In: Zlatev J, Racine T, Sinha 
C, Itkonen E (eds) The shared mind: perspectives on intersub-
jectivity. John Benjamins, Amsterdam, pp 17–38
Gallagher S, Hutto D (2019) Narrative in embodied therapeutic prac-
tice: getting the story straight. In: Payne H, Tantia J, Koch S, 
Fuchs T (eds) Embodied perspectives in psychotherapy. Rout-
ledge, London
Gallese V (2001) The “shared manifold” hypothesis: from mirror 
neurons to empathy. J Conscious Stud 8:33–50
Gallese V (2008) Mirror neurons and the social nature of language: 
the neural exploitation hypothesis. Soc Neurosci 3(3–4):317–333
Gazzola V, Keysers C (2008) The observation and execution of actions 
share motor and somatosensory voxels in all tested subjects: 
single-subject analyses of unsmoothed fMRI data. Cereb Cortex 
19(6):1239–1255
Geiger M (1910) Über das Wesen und die Bedeutung der Einfühlung. 
In: Schumann F (ed) IV. Kongress für experimentelle Psychologie 
(29–73). Barth VJA Leipzig 2010/2011. Translated by Gödel F, 
Aragonaas M (2015) On the essence and meaning of empathy 
(Parts I & II). Dialog Philos Mental Neurosci 8(1):19–31 and 
8(2):75–86
Goldman A (2005) Imitation, mind reading, and simulation. In: Hurley 
S, Chater N (eds) Perspectives on imitation II. MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, pp 79–93
Goldman A (2006) Simulating minds. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Goldman A (2011) Two routes to empathy. In: Coplan A, Goldie P 
(eds) Empathy: philosophical and psychological perspectives. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 31–44
Goldstein K, Scheerer M (1964) Abstract and concrete behavior: an 
experimental study with special tests. Evanston, IL: Northwest-
ern University. Reprint of Psychological Monographs 53(2):1941
Goldstein TR, Winner E (2010) A new lens on the development of 
social cognition: the study of acting. In: Milbrath C, Lightfoot 
C (eds) Art and human. Taylor & Francis Group, New York, 
pp 221–247
Grodal T, Kramer M (2010) Empathy, film, and the brain. Recherches 
sémiotiques/Semiotic Inquiry 30(1–2–3):19–35
Hatfield E, Rapson RL, Le YCL (2011) Emotional contagion and 
empathy. In: Batson CD et al (eds) The social neuroscience of 
empathy. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 19–30
Hauk O, Johnsrude I, Pulvermüller F (2004) Somatotopic representa-
tion of action words in human motor and premotor cortex. Neuron 
41(2):301–307
Heimann K, Umiltà MA, Guerra M, Gallese V (2014) Moving mir-
rors: a high-density EEG study investigating the effect of camera 
movements on motor cortex activation during action observation. 
J Cognit Neurosci 26(9):2087–2101
Heimann K, Uithol S, Calbi M, Umiltà MA, Guerra M, Gallese V 
(2017) ‘Cuts in action’: a high-density EEG study investigating 
the neural correlates of different editing techniques in film. Cognit 
Sci 41(6):1555–1588
Husserl E (1952) Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänome-
nologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch. Phänomenologische 
Untersuchungen zur Konstitution, Husserliana 4. Martinus 
Nijhoff, Den Haag
Husserl E (1964) Cartesian meditations. Trans. D. Cairns. Kluwer 
Academic, London
Husserl E (1973) Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität I. Hus-
serliana 13. Martinus Nijhoff, Den Haag
Husserl E (1980) Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung (Husserliana 
XXIII). Martinus Nijhoff, Den Haag
Hutto DD (2007) The narrative practice hypothesis: origins and appli-
cations of folk psychology. R Inst Philos Suppl 60:43–68
Jacob P (2011) The direct perception model of empathy: a critique. Rev 
Philos Psychol 2(3):519–540
Kaltwasser L (2018) Sharing the filmic experience—the physiol-
ogy of socio-emotional processes in the cinema. In: Conference 
 S. Gallagher, J. Gallagher 
1 3
presentation: being moved. art, film, narrative, and the body-brain 
(June 4–6 2018) Berlin
Kosslyn SM, Thompson WL (2003) When is early visual cortex acti-
vated during visual mental imagery? Psychol Bull 129(5):723
Lamy B (1699) La Rhétorique ou l’art de parler, 4th  edn. n.p, 
Amsterdam
Lipps T (1905) Die ethischen Grundfragen. Leopold Voss Verlag, 
Hamburg
Lipps T (1906) Ästhetik. Verlag von L. Voss, Leipzig
Lipps T (1909) Leitfaden der Psychologie. Engelmann, Leipzig
Lutterbie J (2011) Toward a general theory of acting: cognitive science 
and performance. Springer, Berlin
Merleau-Ponty M (2012) Phenomenology of perception, Trans Landes 
D. Routledge, London
Metcalf JT (1931) Empathy and the actor’s emotion. J Soc Psychol 
2(2):235–238
Montero B (2010) Does bodily awareness interfere with highly skilled 
movement? Inquiry 53(2):105–122
Moran D (2017) Intercorporeality and intersubjectivity: a phenomeno-
logical exploration of embodiment. In: Durt C, Fuchs T, Tewes 
C (eds) Embodiment, enaction and culture: investigating the con-
stitution of the shared world. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 25–46
Nelson K (2003) Narrative and the emergence of a consciousness of 
self. In: Fireman GD, McVay TEJ, Flanagan O (eds) Narrative 
and consciousness. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 17–36
Price CJ, Devlin JT (2011) The interactive account of ventral 
occipitotemporal contributions to reading. Trends Cognit Sci 
15(6):246–253
Raz G, Winetraub Y, Jacob J, Kinreich S, Maron-Katz A, Shaham 
G, Podlipsky I, Gilam G, Soreq E, Hendler T (2012) Portraying 
emotions at their unfolding: a multilayered approach for probing 
dynamics of neural networks. NeuroImage 60:1448–1461
Richner ES, Nicolopoulou A (2001) The narrative construction of dif-
fering conceptions of the person in the development of young 
children’s social understanding. Early Edu Dev 12:393–432
Ricoeur P (1992) Oneself as another. Trans. K. Blamey. University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago
Rucinska Z (2014) Basic pretending as sensorimotor engagement. Con-
temp Sensorimotor Theory 15:175–187
Ryle G (1949) The concept of mind. Hutchinson, London
Salice A, Høffding S, Gallagher S (2017) Putting plural self-awareness 
into practice: the phenomenology of expert musicianship. Topoi. 
https ://doi.org/10.1007/s1124 5-017-9451-2
Sartre J-P (2004) The Imaginary, trans. J. Webber. Routledge, London
Schleiermacher F (1977) Hermeneutics: the handwritten manuscripts. 
Trans. Duke J, Forstmann J. Scholars Press, Missoula [Original: 
Compendium, 1819]
Scruton R (2009) Working towards art. Br J Aesthet 49(4):317–325
Shuler MG, Bear MF (2006) Reward timing in the primary visual cor-
tex. Science 311(5767):1606–1609
Singer T, Seymour S, O’doherty JP, Stephan EK, Dolan RJ, Frith CD 
(2006) Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived 
fairness of others. Nature 439:466–469
Slovic P (2007) If I look at the mass I will never act: psychic numbing 
and genocide. Judgm Decis Mak 2:79–95
Smith M (1995) Engaging characters: fiction, emotion, and the cinema. 
Clarendon Press, Oxford
Smith M (2011) On the twofoldness of character. New Lit Hist 
42(2):277–294
Smith M (2017) Film, art, and the third culture: a naturalized aesthetics 
of film. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Stanislavski C (1936) An actor prepares. Trans. E. R. Hapgood. Theatre 
Arts Inc., New York, reprinted 1989, Routledge, London
Stein E (2012) On the problem of empathy. Trans. W. Stein. Springer, 
Dordrecht
Stueber KR (2006) Rediscovering empathy: agency, folk-psychology 
and the human sciences. MIT Press, Cambridge
Stueber KR (2008) Reasons, generalizations, empathy, and narratives: 
the epistemic structure of action explanation. History Theory 
47:31–43
Tettamanti M, Buccino G, Saccuman MC, Gallese V, Danna M, Scifo P 
et al (2005) Listening to action-related sentences activates fronto-
parietal motor circuits. J Cogn Neurosci 17:273–281
Thompson E (2001) Empathy and consciousness. J Consci Stud 
8(5–6):1–32
Titchener EB (1909) Lectures on the experimental psychology of 
thought-processes. Macmillan, New York
Umiltà MA, Berchio C, Sestito M, Freedberg D, Gallese V (2012) 
Abstract art and cortical motor activation: an EEG study. Front 
Hum Neurosci. https ://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum .2012.00311 
Wollheim R (1987) Painting as an art. Thames and Hudson, London
Xu X, Zuo X, Wang X, Han S (2009) Do you feel my pain? Racial 
group membership modulates empathic neural responses. J Neu-
rosci 29(26):8525–8529
Zahavi D (2001) Beyond empathy: phenomenological approaches to 
intersubjectivity. J Conscious Stud 8(5–7):151–167
Zahavi D (2012) Empathy and mirroring: Husserl and Gallese. 
In: Breeur R, Melle U (eds) Life, subjectivity & art. Springer, 
Dordrecht, pp 217–254
Zahavi D (2014) Self and other: exploring subjectivity, empathy, and 
shame. Oxford University Press, Oxford
